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1. Introduction  
It is quite uncommon to associate migration with the rules on services trade. Indeed, all 
economic definitions of services insist on their immaterial nature and on the increased 
possibility of trading them ‘virtually’ over networks or else, without any physical movement of 
the parties involved. Somehow this ‘immaterial’ nature of services reflects on their 
providers/recipients which seem to be ‘invisible’. Even though most services still require the 
physical contact of the provider with the recipient1
The legal definition of services in Article 57 TFEU (ex Art. 50 EC) further nourishes this idea 
about service providers/recipients not being migrants: the relevant Treaty rules only apply 
when the provisions on free movement of workers and freedom of establishment – 
themselves clearly linked to migration – do not apply. This distinction has been fleshed up by 
the ECJ which has consistently held that the distinction between the rules on establishment, 
on the one hand, and the rules on services, on the other, lies on duration.
 and, when provided over national borders, 
do entail migration, service providers and/or recipients are rarely thought of as ‘immigrants’. 
This may be due to the fact that they enter the foreign territory with a specific aim and, once 
this aim accomplished, move back to their state of origin; technically they only qualify as short 
term non-cyclical migrants and are of little interest to policy-makers. A second reason may be 
that both service providers and recipients are economically desirable: the former are typically 
highly skilled and trained professionals and the latter are well-off ‘visitors’, increasing 
consumption in the host state.  
2
The aim of the analysis which follows is to show the extent to which (legislative and judicial) 
policies aimed at the free provision of services actively affect migration conditions within the 
EU. The EC rules on the provision of services primarily affect the movement of EU nationals. 
 Indeed, all EC 
manuals state four types of service provision falling under the EC Treaty: a) where the service 
provider moves to the recipient’s state, for a short period of time (longer stay would amount to 
establishment), b) where the service recipients themselves move to the state where the 
service is offered (eg for medical care, education, tourism etc), c) where both service 
providers and recipients move together in another member state (eg a tourist guide 
accompanying a group travelling abroad) and d) where the service itself is provided across 
the borders (typically through the use of ICTs). None of these situations would typically qualify 
as migration.  
The above ‘dissociation’ between services and migration has been gradually weakened in the 
recent years. Indeed, migration is increasingly connected to the transnational provision of 
services. This is the result of three kinds of factors: developments in the European Court of 
Justice’s (ECJ) case law; legislative initiatives in the EU; and the GATS. Each one of these is 
considered in some detail below.  
                                                        
1 Some authors even talk of ‘co-production’ of services; see L. Rubalcaba, ‘Historical and 
anthropological origin of the service economy’ in L. Rubalcaba, The new service economy, 
Challenges and policy implications for Europe, (Cheltenham/Northampton: Edward Elgar, 
2007) 14-42. 
2 See below, 2.1. 
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As it will be shown below, however, third country nationals (TCNs) may also claim the 
benefits of the rules on services, either as recipients thereof or as employees of some EC 
undertaking which is providing services in another member state (posted workers). 
2. The ECJ extending the rules on services to cover migration 
In these last years the ECJ has applied quite extensively the Treaty rules on services.3 Some 
aspects of this case law have provoked vivid – occasionally violent – reactions, while others 
have gone quite unnoticed. In the former category, the recent cases concerning posted 
workers, have not only aggrieved trade unions and surprised lawyers specialising in labour 
and social law, but they have even prompted some of the most prominent EU scholars to ask 
for disobedience to the Court.4
2.1 Rules on services to apply on long-term establishment 
 In the latter category, the extensive application of the rules on 
services in cases where a long-term establishment is involved, has only been noticed by few 
scholars – and has been welcomed by many of them. Both these developments are highly 
relevant as means of opening up further migration.  
According to the black letter of Article 56 TFEU (ex 49 EC), it is supposed to apply to 
situations where no other Treaty freedom applies; it has a subordinate character. In this 
respect, services (Article 56 TFEU) were traditionally distinguished from establishment (Article 
49 TFEU, ex 43 EC) by virtue of their temporary nature. Hence, in the German insurance 
case,5 the Court held that as soon as the service provider acquired some stable infrastructure 
in the host State, the Treaty provisions on establishment became applicable. This position 
was later reviewed in Gebhard,6 where the Court recognized that a provider of services within 
the meaning of Article 56 TFEU (49 EC) could make use of some permanent infrastructure in 
the host State. Nevertheless, the Court insisted on the temporal character of the provision of 
services. It stated that ‘not only the duration of the provision of the service, but also its 
regularity, periodicity or continuity’7 may bring it under the rules on establishment. This made 
commentators conclude that service provision must be of an ‘episodic’ or ‘irregular’ nature.8
                                                        
3 See in general for the Court’s case law Hatzopoulos, Vassilis and Do, Uyen, ‘The Case Law 
of the ECJ Concerning the Free Provision of Services: 2000-2005’ (2006) 40 CMLRev 923-
991; and before that Hatzopoulos, Vassilis, ‘Recent developments of the case law of the ECJ 
in the field of free movement of services 1994-1999’, (2000) 37 CMLRev 43-82. 
  
4 Scharpf, Fritz,  ‘The only solution is to refuse to comply with ECJ rulings’ 4:1 (2009) Social 
Europe Journal (6 April 2009), available at http://www.social-europe.eu/2009/04/interview-the-
only-solution-is-to-refuse-to-comply-with-ecj-rulings/  
5 Case 205/84, Commission v. Germany, Insurance, [1986] ECR 3755. 
6 Case C-55/94, Gebhard, [1995] ECR I-4165. 
7 Para 27 of the judgment. 
8 See Hatzopoulos, n. 3 above, 45, where this restrictive approach of the Court was also 
criticized as being inappropriate in view of the current development and sophistication of 
services. 
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In its most recent case law, however, the Court seems to be abandoning the temporal 
criterion in favour of a more economic one. Indeed, the Court seems ready to treat economic 
activities which qualify as services under Article 56 TFEU (49 EC), irrespective of their 
duration. The first clear move in this direction occurred in the Schnitzer judgment.9 Mr. 
Schnitzer, a German national, was pursued in Germany for having employed a Portuguese 
construction company for three years, without it being registered in conformity with the 
German legislation. The first question asked to the Court was whether the Portuguese 
company should be deemed to be established, in the sense of Art 43 EC, or on the contrary, if 
it were merely providing services in Germany. If the former were true, then the company 
should abide by all the regulations of the host Member State. If the latter qualification applied, 
then according to well-established case law, the service provider could not be expected to 
fulfil all the requirements of the host State - especially not registration requirements, unless 
such a requirement were justified by an overriding reason of general interest.10 In order to 
reply to the question asked, the Court referred to the same criteria as in Gebhard, i.e. the 
duration, the regularity, the periodical nature and the continuity of the service, but reached the 
a diametrically opposed conclusion. The Court found that the above characteristics were not 
enough to make service provision fall within the scope of Article 49 TFEU (43 EC): ‘services 
within the meaning of the Treaty may cover services varying widely in nature, including 
services which are provided over an extended period, even over several years […]. Services 
within the meaning of the Treaty may likewise be constituted by services which a business 
established in a Member State supplies with a greater or lesser degree of frequency or 
regularity, even over an extended period, to persons established in one or more other 
Member States’.11
This is an important statement where the Court, explicitly for the first time,
  
12 seems to be 
favoring an economic approach over a legalistic one, thus abandoning the artificial distinction 
between services and establishment. Such a trend could already be identified in some earlier 
cases concerning ‘naturally’ trans-border services, such as TV broadcasting, 
telecommunications or transport,13
                                                        
9 Case C-215/01, Schnitzer, [2003] ECR I-14847. 
10 See eg the Tourist Guide cases, see Cases C-154/89, C-180/89 and C-189/89, respectively 
Commission v. France, Italy and Greece, [1991] ECR I-659. 
 where the Court applied Article 56 TFEU (49 EC) without 
taking into account any temporal consideration. However, the case under discussion, not only 
makes it clear that it is the economic nature – and not the duration – of the activity that 
11 Schnitzer, n. 9 above, para 30. 
12 The seeds for this finding had been shown in case C-131/01, Commission v. Italy, Patent 
Agents, [2003] ECR I-1659, where the Court held that, although the submission and follow-up 
of patent applications and the protection of patents awarded did entail a series of actions 
spread over a long period of time, this did not mean that the activity in question necessarily 
entail a stable and continuous participation in the economic life of the host State. 
13 Case C-17/00, De Coester, [2001] ECR I-9445; Joined Cases C-544/03 and C-545/03, 
Mobistar and Belgacom [2005] ECR I-7723; and Case C-92/01, Stylianakis, [2003] ECR I-
1291, respectively. 
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constitutes the main criterion for its legal classification, it also creates a presumption in favour 
of the application of Article 56 TFEU (49 EC) in all service situations. The Court finds that an 
a priori registration requirement of service providers may not be justified because ‘at the 
moment when a provider of services envisages supplying services in the host Member State 
and examination of the conditions governing access to the activities concerned is carried out, 
it is often difficult to say whether those services are going to be supplied just once or very 
occasionally or whether, on the other hand, they will be supplied in a repeated or more or less 
regular manner’.14 In other words, the Court states that the nature of the activity is readily 
ascertainable and can safely lead to legal qualifications, while its duration, periodicity, etc., 
are not.15
In this way, the concept of service under the EC Treaty is brought into line with that under the 
WTO agreement and the GATS.
  
16 Moreover, logic and coherence are introduced in the way 
that EC Treaty provisions apply, since the legal category of services is prima facie made to 
coincide with the economic one. Instituted at a time when service activities represented an 
insignificant part of the economic activity of Member States, the traditional analysis according 
to which services constitute a residual category could no longer hold true. Henceforth, the 
rules on establishment which exist under the EC Treaty (in contrast to the GATS, where no 
such rules exist), ought to apply only in those cases where the service provider genuinely and 
permanently moves to another Member State. This should be ascertained, according to the 
Court, by reference to two criteria: a) a material criterion, whereby the infrastructure set up by 
the service provider goes beyond what is strictly necessary for the temporal provision of 
specific services and b) an intentional criterion, whereby the service provider ‘holds himself 
out to, amongst others, nationals of the second Member State’17
The (r)evolution of the concept of services catalysed by the judgment in Schnitzer, largely 
unnoticed by the doctrine,
 and intends to acquire and 
occupy a market share in this State.  
18 was confirmed by the Court, some months later, in a case against 
Portugal concerning private security firms.19
                                                        
14 Schnitzer, n. 
 The Portuguese legislation at stake only 
9, para 39. 
15 It is worth noting that the Services Directive (for which see below 3.1 and especially 3.1.1) 
follows broadly the same logic, since in rec 5 it considers that liberalisation is important for 
“operators 
who wish to become established in other Member States as well as those who provide a 
service in another Member State without being established there’. Thereafter, the directive 
contains (distinct) rules for the provision of services, both by undertakings established and by 
undertakings occasionally acting within the territory of another Member State (Chapters III 
and IV, respectively). 
16 For which see below, para 4. 
17 Schnitzer, n. 9 above, para 32. 
18 Some authors have observed the newness of the Court’s approach but have hesitated to 
identify a fully new direction, see e.g. Prieto Catherine, ‘Liberté d’établissement et de 
prestation de services’, (2004) RTDE, 543 speaks of the temporal criterion as being “dilaté” in 
this case. 
19 Case C-171/02, Commission v. Portugal, Private Security Firms, [2004] I-5645. 
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concerned undertakings offering private security services within Portugal for longer than a 
calendar year.20 The question arose whether the said legislation could be judged by reference 
to Article 56 TFEU (49 EC). The Court repeated its findings in Schnitzer and further widened 
the scope of application of the rules on services. For the Court held that ‘all services that are 
not offered on a stable and continuous basis from an established professional base in the 
Member State of destination constitute provision of services within the meaning of Article 49 
EC’21. This being said the Court further emphasized that ‘no provision of the Treaty affords a 
means of determining, in an abstract manner, the duration or frequency beyond which the 
supply of a service or of a certain type of service in another Member State can no longer be 
regarded as the provision of services within the meaning of the Treaty’.22
It, therefore, becomes clear, that any EU national wishing to exercise an economic activity 
which qualifies as a service in another member state may, henceforth, invoke the rules on 
services, even if such service provision entails a (temporary?) migration. Under any kind of 
classification of migrations,
 The negative 
formulation used by the Court together with the casuistic approach put forward considerably 
widens the scope of application of Article 56 TFEU (49 EC), while it does away, once and for 
all, with the myth of services being a subsidiary category. 
23
This is not a purely theoretical development, but has serious practical consequences. While 
the Treaty provisions on the free movement of workers and freedom of establishment are 
based on the idea that migrants should, in principle, comply with all the requirements of the 
host state, the service providers are allowed, to a large extent, to rely on their home state 
regulatory framework while offering their services abroad. Through the imposition of extensive 
mutual recognition obligations and administrative cooperation, the Court has put into place an 
imperfect (and unspoken) country of origin principle (CoOP).
 a delocalisation for a period of one – or several – years in 
another state does qualify as migration and, indeed, long term migration. Therefore, all the 
rules on services – including the Services Directive – become relevant for intra-EU migration.  
24 This translates into some kind 
of regime portability: all qualifications, guarantee deposits, other authorisation requirements 
examined by the home state, safety and security regulations complied with in the home state 
etc, should be given full effect in the host state.25
                                                        
20 The Court had already accepted that a period of a calendar year did not counter the 
application of the rules on the free provision of services in Joined Cases C-369/96 and C-
376/96, Arblade and Leloup, [1999] ECR I-8453. 
 Therefore, in the very Schnitzer judgment, 
21 Commission v Portugal, above n 19, para 25 in fine, emphasis added. 
22 Ibid, para 26. 
23 See e.g. King, Russel ‘Towards a New Map of European Migration’, International Journal of 
Population Geography, 8 (2002) 89-106 and Triandafyllidou, Anna, Gropas, Ruby and Vogel, 
David (2007) ‘Introduction’ and Triandafyllidou, Anna and Gropas, Ruby ‘Concluding Remarks’, 
in Triandafyllidou, Anna and Gropas, Ruby (eds) European Immigration. A Sourcebook 
(Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007) 1-19, and 361-376. 
24 See Hatzopoulos, Vassilis ‘Que reste-t-il de la directive sur les services ? CDE 43 (3-
4/2008) 299-358, 313-315. 
25 See in this respect Hatzopoulos, Vassilis,  Le principe communautaire d’équivalence et de 
reconnaissance mutuelle dans la libre prestation de services,  (Athènes/Bruxelles :  
Sakkoulas/Bruylant, 1999) ; and more recently Hatzopoulos, Vassilis, ‘Le principe de 
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which concerned construction works extending over a period of three years, the Court held 
that if an entry to the trades register were justified at all, such an entry ‘cannot be other than 
automatic, and that requirement cannot constitute a condition precedent for the provision of 
services’. In the recent cases concerning posted workers (for which see below para 2.2) the 
Court went as far as recognising that this regime portability covers, under circumstances, also 
the employment legislation and collective agreements in force in the home state.  
It is clear that this regime portability enhances the mobility of service providers across the 
borders. Therefore, the extension ratione temporis of the scope of application of the rules on 
services to cover periods extending to several years may have positive impact on intra-
community migration; it may, therefore, qualify as a facilitator.26
2.2. Posted workers 
 While, on the face of it, such 
a facilitator only concerns EU nationals, in the following paragraphs it will be shown that third 
country nationals (TCNs) are also to a large extent favoured in their migration plans by such a 
development. 
The starting point in the Court’s case law concerning posted workers are cases Evi v Seco, 
Rush Portuguesa and Vander Elst.27 The first concerned a French undertaking using third 
country nationals in railway repairs in Luxembourg, the second a Portuguese undertaking 
deploying Portuguese nationals (at a time when they did not yet benefit from free movement) 
in railway construction in France and the third, a Belgian undertaking deploying Moroccan 
workers in construction (read: demolition) works in France. Red together, these three cases 
broadly settled the issue of posted workers, along with three key principles: a) a service 
provider may move from one member state to another with his own personnel, irrespective of 
their nationality, without having to satisfy supplementary administrative requirements linked 
either to immigration or to labour market regulations; b) a service provider may, nonetheless, 
be required to comply with the legislation (collective agreements, arbitral sentences etc.) of 
the host State concerning minimum remuneration and other working conditions and all 
national measures reasonably suited to enforcing /monitoring such a requirement are 
acceptable;28
                                                                                                                                                              
reconnaissance mutuelle dans la libre prestation de services’ paper delivered in a conference 
on ‘Mutual Recognition’ organised by the Université Robert Schuman de Strasbourg,  on 5 
December 2008, available at 
 c) a service provider may not be required to comply with all the social security 
obligations and linked formalities for workers who are already covered in his (home) State of 
establishment, unless such burdens actually add up to the protection of workers.  These 
http://www.coleurope.eu/template.asp?pagename=lawpapers . 
26 For the concept of migration facilitators see, among several writers, Papademetriou, 
Demetrios, ‘Managing Rapid and Deep Change in the Newest Age of Migration’, in Spencer, 
Sarah, The Politics of Immigration, Managing Opportunity, Conflict and Change 
(Massachusetts etc: Blackwell, 2003), 39-58. 
27 Joined Cases 62/81 and 63/ 81, Evi v. Seco, [1982] ECR I-223; Case C-113/89, Rush 
Portuguesa, [1990] ECR I-1417; Case C-43/93, Vander Elst, [1994] ECR I-3803. 
28 For the importance of minimal pay agreements as a means to combat poverty see Funk, 
Lothar & Lesch, Hagen, ‘Minimum Wage Regulations in Selected European Countries’, 
(2006) Intereconomics, 89. 
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basic principles, especially in relation to minimum pay, were later ‘codified’ by Directive 
96/71.29
All three principles above were consequently confirmed in Arblade and Leloup.
 The Directive also provided for the designation of one ore more ‘liaison offices’ and 
for cooperation between the competent national authorities in order to facilitate the free 
provision of services.  
30 This case 
concerned two French undertakings which had been employing their own personnel (the 
nationality of which is not specified in the Court’s judgment) in Silo constructions in Belgium 
and had infringed regulations which, among other things, a) imposed a minimum pay, b) 
necessitated the drawing-up, keeping and retaining of social documents for each one of the 
workers employed and c) required the payment of supplementary social security contributions 
for each worker, in the form of “timbres intempéries” and “timbres-fidélité” . According to the 
principles above, the Court accepted a), but rejected b) and c). It is also worth noting that, 
following the adoption of Directive 96/71 and while the above judgments were still pending, 
on February 1999, the Commission tabled a draft directive on the posting of workers who are 
third-country nationals for the provision of cross-border services31
2.2.1 Softening up administrative requirements for entry and work 
, but this initiative did not 
receive the support of member states and was subsequently dropped from the Commission’s 
agenda. 
It is in the last ten years, however, that developments in the area of posted workers have 
been spectacular; in at least two respects. For one thing, the Court has cut down on national 
administrative requirements concerning entry and working conditions of TCNs (2.2.1). More 
importantly, the Court, has somehow curbed the principle that posted workers should be fully 
subject to working and pay conditions of the host country (2.2.2). While the former 
development makes it easier for TCNs to integrate the EU job market, the latter confers on 
them (or gives them back) a clear competitive advantage over indigenous workers. 
Already in Vander Elst32 the Court had held that it was enough for TCNs legally resident and 
employed in Belgium and temporarily posted to France, to comply only with the migration 
requirements of the latter state and that no individual working permits could be required by 
the French authorities. Similarly, in Commission v. Luxembourg, posted workers I33
                                                        
29 Directive 96/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 1996 
concerning the posting of workers in the framework of the provision of services, OJ [1996] L 
18/ 1; the word codified is oversimplifying in this context, as the exact content of the Directive 
and the extent to which it restricts or expands the scope of application of previous case law 
has been hotly disputed by legal scholars, see eg Davies, Paul, ‘Posted workers: Single 
market or protection of national labour law systems?’ 34 CMLRev (1997) 571-602; Meyer, 
Francis, ‘Libre circulation des travailleurs et libre prestation de services, à propos de la 
directive « détachement du travailleur »’, RIDE (1998) 57-73. 
30 Joined Cases C-369/96 and 376/96, Arblade, [1999] ECR I-8453. 
31 [1999] OJ C 67/ 12. 
32 Case C-43/93 Vander Elst [1994] ECR I-3803. 
, was at 
stake a rule whereby all service providers deploying non-EU personnel in Luxembourg should 
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have their personnel obtain an individual working permit or, alternatively, have a collective 
working permit issued for them. This rule only concerned the right to work and applied on top 
of any entry requirements to which workers were already subject. The Court found that the 
objectives of the legislation in question, i.e. the social welfare of non-EU workers and the 
stability of the Luxembourg labour market could be equally attained through a system of 
simple declaration, instead of an authorisation requirement; being unnecessary to the 
attainment of the above objectives the measure in question unduly restricted the service 
providers freedom of movement. It clearly stems, therefore, that TCNs may work in a member 
state without having the required working permit, as long as such work is provided in the 
framework of an employment contract with an undertaking based in any other member state.  
In Commission v. Germany, posted workers,34 the regulation at stake required foreign 
workers to be in possession of an entry and work visa, which was only delivered to posted 
workers provided i.a. that they were already employed with the posting firm for at least a year. 
The Court found this requirement – and in general the visa regime – in violation of Article 56 
TFEU (49 EC) as disproportionate to the pursued objectives. It found, again, that a 
declaration obligation imposed on the posting undertaking would suffice for the protection of 
the reasons invoked by Germany. A similar requirement of the Austrian legislation imposing to 
posted workers in order to obtain, on top of entry visas, an ‘EU posting confirmation’, was also 
condemned in Commission v Austria, posted workers.35 More recently, in Commission v 
Luxembourg, posted workers II,36 the Court went as far as to hold that a mere notification 
obligation, which should be accomplished any time until the first day of work was violating 
Article 49 EC, because it contained ‘ambiguities’ that were able to ‘dissuade undertakings 
wishing to post workers to Luxembourg from exercising their freedom to provide services.’37
2.2.2 Wage and social rights portability 
 
2.2.2.1 Inroads to the full applicability of host state legislation 
Concerning minimum pay, the Court has shown clear signs of departure from the full and 
automatic application of the host State legislation. In Mazzoleni38 the question arose whether 
the personnel of a French security company occasionally deployed in sites in Belgium should 
be paid at the higher tariffs applicable in Belgium. The Court held that the application of the 
host country legislation may become, under certain circumstances, neither necessary nor 
proportional.39
                                                                                                                                                              
33 Case C-445/03 Commission v Luxembourg, posted workers I [2004] ECR I-10191. 
34 Case C-341/02, Commission v. Germany, [2005] ECR I-2733. 
35 Case C-168/04 Commission v Austria, posted workers [2006] ECR I-9041; in the same 
case was also condemned the impossibility to regularise on the spot workers once posted. 
36 Case C-319/06 Commission v Luxembourg, posted workers II [2008] ECR I-4323. 
37 Ibid para 81. In the more recent case C-219/08 Commission v Belgium, posted workers nyr, 
however, the Court was ready to accept the obligation imposed on posting service providers 
to submit declarations concerning the status of their posted workers.  
38Case C-165/98, Mazzoleni, [2001] ECR I-2189. 
39 Ibid, para 30, emphasis added. 
 The necessity test requires the host State authorities to verify whether their 
 11 
national legislation is needed to ensure an ‘equivalent’ level of remuneration for workers, 
taking into account fiscal and social charges applicable in the States concerned.40 Even if the 
necessity test is satisfied, the application of the host State legislation may still be countered if 
it entails disproportionate administrative burdens for the service provider or inequalities 
between its employees (proportionality test).41 A few months later in Portugaia Construcoes42 
the Court held that the host State’s collective agreement on salaries could be applied only if it 
contributed in a ‘significant way’ to the employees’ social protection.43 Therefore the 
sacrosanct principle of the respect of host State minimum pay requirements becomes 
conditional on a) significantly increasing the employees’ revenue and b) not disproportionally 
burdening the employer (!).44 Broadly the same principles above apply in relation to social 
security contributions in the host State, following the Court’s judgment in Finalarte.45
It is, however, with its infamous judgments in Laval, Viking and Rüffert,
 
 
2.2.2.2 Portability of home state legislation? 
46 that the Court has 
administered a decisive blow to the applicability of host state minimum wages and rules of 
social protection and has opened the way for some kind of regime portability for posted 
workers. These judgments are extremely important in many respects and have aroused 
excitement among trade-unions, practitioners and academic writers.47
                                                        
40 Ibid, para 35. 
41 Ibid, para 36. 
42 Case C-164/99 Portugaia Construções [2002] ECR I-787. 
43 Ibid, para 29. 
44 This is a peculiar proportionality test: usually the restrictive measure is appraised as against 
a less restrictive one, while here the competing interests themselves are being compared. 
45 Joined Cases C-49/98, C-50/98, C-52/98 to C-54/98 and C-68/98 to C-71/98, Finalarte, 
[2001] ECR I-7831. 
46 Case C-341/05 Laval and Partneri [2007] ECR I-11767; Case C-438/05 Viking [2007] ECR 
I-10779 and Case C-346/06 Rüffert [2008] ECR I-1989.  
 It is not my intention to 
47 For the latter, see, among many, Cremers, Jan, Dolvik, Jon-Erik & Bosch, Gerhard, 
‘Posting of workers in the single market: attempts to prevent social dumping and regime 
competition in the EU?’ 38:6 Industrial Relations Journal (2007) 524-541; Malmberg, Jonas & 
Sigeman, Tore, ‘Industrial actions and EU economic freedoms: the autonomous collective 
bargaining model curtailed by the ECJ’ (2008) 45 CMLRev 1115-1146; Ronmar, Mia, ‘Free 
movement of services vs national labour law and industrial relations systems: understanding 
the Laval case from a Swedish and Nordic perspective’ (2008) 10 CYEL 493-521; Ashiagbor, 
Diamond, ‘Collective Labor Rights and the European Social Model’ (2009) 3 Law and Ethics 
of Human Rights, 222-266; Barnard, Catherine, ‘Viking and Laval: An Introduction’  (2008) 10 
CYEL 463-492; Dashwood, Alan, ‘Viking and Laval: Issues of Horizontal Direct Effect (2008) 
10 CYEL 525-540; Deakin, Simon, ‘Regulatory Competition after Laval’ (2008) 10 CYEL 581-
609; Hös, Nikolett, ‘The principle of proportionality in the Viking and Laval cases: an 
appropriate standard of judicial review? (2009) 6 EUI Working paper; Novitz, Tonia, ‘A Human 
Rights Analysis for the Viking and Laval Judgments’ (2008) 10 CYEL 541-562; Sciarra, 
Sylvana, ‘Viking and Laval: Collective Labour Rights and Market Freedoms in the Enlarged 
EU’ (2008) 10 CYEL 563-580; Woolfson, Charles & Sommers, Jeff, ‘Labour Mobility in 
Construction: European Implications of the Laval un Partneri Dispute with Swedish Labour’ 
(2006) 12 European Journal of Industrial Relations 49-68; Joerges, Christian & Rödl, Franz, 
‘Informal Politics, Formalised Law and the “Social Deficit” of European Integration: Reflections 
after the Judgments of the ECJ in Viking and Laval (2009) 15 ELJ 1-19; see also Blanpain, 
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provide yet another analysis of these cases; instead I will only focus on the question of 
minimum wages. In Laval and Viking the main question raised was that of the legality of 
industrial action undertaken by trade unions in high-wage countries (Sweden and Finland, 
respectively) in order impose their own wage requirements on low-wage posted workers (from 
Latvia and Estonia, respectively, at a time when such workers enjoyed no right to work on 
their own). In Viking the question was only debated under the perspective of Article 56 TFEU 
(49 EC), while in Laval Directive 96/71 was also held to be applicable.48 The Court held, for 
the first time, industrial action to be a fundamental right which should be available to trade 
unions in order to protect the interests of their members. Such right, however, should be 
exercised in accordance to the Treaty fundamental freedoms (such as the freedom of 
establishment and the free provision of services) and only be the source of restrictions which 
are proportional to the aims pursued. It is this proportionality test which has a sting in the tail, 
since for its application it is necessary to take into account the level of protection afforded to 
workers in their home state and compare it with the protection level for which trade unions are 
fighting. Only ‘if it were established that the jobs or conditions of employment at issue were 
[…] jeopardised or under serious threat’ would the exercise of the right to strike be justified in 
view of the internal market requirements. This seems to be a much weaker test than the usual 
equivalence test followed by the Court: what is required is not that the protection offered by 
the home state is equivalent or, at least, comparable to that offered by the host state 
legislation; it is enough that the workers’ condition is not ‘under serious threat’.49
Failure to take into account the level of protection ensured under the home state legislation is 
not merely a hinderance to the enjoyment of the fundamental freedoms, but a discrimination 
proper: it is one of the rare situations where discrimination lies in the application of the same 
rules to different situations, the difference being that foreign service providers are already 
subject to their home rules on workers’ protection. In other words, the failure to apply the 
principle of mutual recognition (of social and other charges) amounts, in this case, to 
discrimination!
 
50 Such discrimination may only be upheld by virtue of some express Treaty 
exception and not by overriding reasons of general interest.51
The need to take into account the level of protection already offered by the legislation of the 
home state has been further confirmed in very strong words in both cases. In Viking, without 
  
                                                                                                                                                              
Robert, (ed) The Laval and Viking Cases. Freedom of Services and Establishment v. 
Industrial Conflict in the European Economic Area and Russia (2009) 69 Bulletin of 
comparative labour relations, The Netherlands, Kluwer Law International. 
48 This aspect of the judgment alone is open to considerable criticism since it seems to be 
recognising that the rules of a directive are relevant in a dispute between private parties (the 
posting undertakings on one hand and the trade unions on the other), ie the directive has 
horizontal direct effect; see in particular Dashwood and Deakin, in the previous footnote. 
49 Which, of course, raises the subsequent question of how ‘serious’ a threat is serious 
enough… 
50 See eg Viking para 72 and Laval para 116. 
51 Laval para 119; it is worth noting that this distinction as to the causes which may justify 
discriminatory and non-discriminatory measures had been generally eclipsed from the recent 
case law of the Court, only to make an impressive comeback in the case under consideration. 
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further ado, the Court found the general Flag of Convenience (FOC) policy pursued by the 
ITF (the International Transport Worker’s Federation) to be foul of the Treaty provisions 
because it was applied ‘irrespective of whether or not that owner’s exercise of its right of 
freedom of establishment is liable to have a harmful effect on the work or conditions of 
employment of its employees’.52 Similarly, in Laval the Lex Britannia was condemned since it 
failed ‘to take into account, irrespective of their content, collective agreements to which 
undertakings that post workers to Sweden are already bound in the Member State in which 
they are established’.53 Further, in Commission v Austria, posted workers  the Court held the 
requirement that Austrian wage and employment conditions be routinely observed contrary to 
Article 49 EC since it ‘does not take account of the measures for the protection of workers by 
which the undertaking intending to carry out the posting is bound in the Member State of 
origin’. 54
The posted workers Directive 96/71 for its part, which was supposed to make sure that basic 
employment regulations of the host state apply to all workers posted there,
  
55 has been 
seriously undermined by the Court in Laval, and even more so in the subsequent Rüffert and 
Commission v Luxembourg cases,56 in four ways. First, the scope of measures which the host 
member state may impose on posted workers has been drastically circumscribed: a) it may 
not apply measures which have not been agreed upon following some of the procedures 
described in the Directive,57 b) which are of no general territorial application,58 c) which do not 
fix the actual level of pay but limit themselves to setting criteria for its calculation,59 or d) 
which prescribe wages above the bare minimum.60 At any rate, the list of issues enumerated 
in the Directive, and about which the host state may apply its own legislation, is an exhaustive 
one.61
                                                        
52 Viking  para 89. 
53 Laval para 116. 
 Second, the possibility of the host state to impose measures justified by public order 
considerations, is also seriously restricted: the concept of public order is a community one – 
54 Above n 35, para 49. 
55 The Posted Workers Directive in fact creates an exception to the general private 
international law rules, as enshrined in the Rome Convention, now turned into Regulation 
(EC) 593/2008 on the law applicable to contractual obligations [2008] OJ L 177/6, according 
to which, unless otherwise agreed, workers in temporary postings remain subject to their 
home state rules; see for a full argument about the Regulation, the Posted Workers Directive 
and the judgments under consideration, Deakin above n 48, 590-595. 
56 Case C-346/06 Rüffert [2008] ECR I-1989; Case C-319/06 Commission v Luxembourg, 
posted workers II [2008] ECR I-4323; the former case concerned the obligation imposed by a 
German Lander that all employees or subcontractors of undertakings executing works within 
its territory receive pay above the national minimum, while the latter concerned several 
aspects of the Luxembourg legislation, including a system of automatic indexation of wages 
above the national minimum. Both were found incompatible with the Posted Workers 
Directive. 
57 Laval paras 63, 67, 70 and 71 
58 Rüffert  para 29. 
59 Rüffert para 24. 
60 Rüffert para 33; Commission v Luxembourg paras 45-55.  
61 Commission v Luxembourg para 26. 
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not left to the individual states to determine – and subject to restrictive interpretation.62 Third, 
contrary to a clear statement in recital 17 and Article 3(7), whereby the Directive’s terms ‘shall 
not prevent application of terms and conditions which are more favourable to workers’, the 
Court finds that member states cannot be allowed ‘to make the provision of services in its 
territory conditional upon the observance of terms and conditions of employment which go 
beyond the mandatory rules for minimum protection’.63 By transforming the ‘floor’ into a 
‘ceiling’,64 the Court not only flies on the face of the express Directive’s provisions, but also 
against ‘the widely accepted understanding of other social policy directives and regulations, 
which do not seek to set out either uniform laws or even a level playing field, but to establish a 
floor of rights above which regulatory competition is possible’.65 Fourth – and this is the 
development having the most far reaching consequences – the Court in the most recent 
Commission v Luxembourg, posted workers II case, discretely opens the way for using the 
Directive against its very objective, in order to pre-empt the host state from imposing its own 
measures to posted workers: for issues which are subject to a minimum harmonisation and 
are, as a matter of law, secured by all member states, the host member state may not impose 
its own (more demanding) conditions.66 It is true that in the judgment under consideration the 
minimum harmonisation contemplated by the Court was organised by a different directive 
(91/533);67
Such a result may seem far-fetched and even absurd in the light of the considerations above. 
From a migration point of view, however, it may not be as undesirable an outcome. Indeed, it 
may be said that the Court’s recent case law is informed from the neoclassical analysis of 
migration.
 according to point ‘Third’ above, however, the Posted Workers Directive itself is a 
harmonisation instrument – possibly a self defeating one.  
Therefore, the Court transforms what was initially thought of as a guarantee against social 
dumping and as a safe harbour from the application of the country of origin principle to quite 
the contrary: to a presumption of regime portability. Such portability stems from Articles 49 
and 56 TFEU (43 and 49 EC) and may, in some occasions, be orchestrated by virtue of the 
very directive which was supposed to avoid it.  
68
                                                        
62 Ibid paras 30-31. 
63 Laval  para 80; Rüffert para 33. 
 The Court tacitly acknowledges wages differential as the main driving force 
behind economic migration and, through the above case law, creates the conditions for wage 
competition and self-regulation through the labour market. Increased offer of labour in high-
wage countries will cause wages to drop, while at the same time wages in the sending 
64 This point is made, among others, by Malmberg & Sigeman, above n 47, 1145. 
65 Excerpt taken from Deakin above fn 47, 597 (footnote omitted).  
66 Commission v Luxembourg paras 38-44. 
67 Council Directive 91/533/EEC on an employer's obligation to inform employees of the 
conditions applicable to the contract or employment relationship [1991] OJ L 288/32. 
68 The Neoclassical theory of migration is just one – probably the most prominent – among 
several theories explaining modern migration; see Massey, Douglas, Arango, Joaquin,  Hugo, 
Graeme Kouaouci, Ali, Pellegrino, Adela and Taylor, Edward ‘Theories of International 
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countries will rise as a consequence of labour shortages there. Eventually, wages in the 
sending/receiving countries will grow closer and the motivation to migrate will decline; by the 
same token real convergence of member states economies will have been achieved. From 
such a perspective the Court’s case law on posted workers makes perfect sense: in the short 
term it enhances migration and, hence, free movement, while in the medium-long term it 
contributes towards ‘an ever closer Union’ since it brings wages and other market conditions 
closer.  
This pro-migration stance of the Court of Justice is not new. Indeed, the Court has constantly 
lent its support to migrant workers, since the beginnings of the Community. Not only has the 
Court supported European workers, but also TCNs associated with some European 
undertaking. In the latter case, instead of the rules on the free movement of workers and 
freedom of establishment, the Court had to ground its findings on the rules on services. It is 
also no secret that the Posted Workers Directive corresponds to the Member States’ effort to 
circumscribe the Court’s early case law on TCNs as posted workers.69
On the other hand, it may not be said that the Court has been unaware of the risks of 
regulatory competition stemming from its pro-migration stance. Already in Vander Elst the 
Court found that ‘the application of the Belgian system in any event excludes any substantial 
risk of workers being exploited or of competition between undertakings being distorted’.
  
70 
This consideration, however, has been forgotten in subsequent case law and, in any event, 
does not hold true after the 2004 and 2007 enlargements and the accession in the 
Community of low-wage countries. Therefore, it could be said that the Court privileges 
migration, integration and effective equalisation of working conditions in the medium term at 
the price of admitting short term regulatory competition. Such an approach, if it does exist, 
makes sense where European nationals are concerned; it makes much less sense in relation 
to TCNs. In the Court’s case law however, such a distinction may not be identified. Based on 
Article 49 EC and the nationality of the employer/service provider – not that of the 
employee/posted worker – the Court’s case law benefits European and non European 
workers alike. It is true that the recent enlargements shifted temporarily the focus from the 
latter to the former, but the way is there open also for migrant workers from third countries.71
                                                                                                                                                              
Migration: A Review and Appraisal’ 19:3 (1993) Population and Development Review, 431-
466. 
69 See Davies, Paul, ‘Posted workers: Single market or protection of national labour law 
systems?’ 34 CMLRev (1997) 571-602; Meyer, Francis, ‘Libre circulation des travailleurs et 
libre prestation de services, à propos de la directive « détachement du travailleur »’, RIDE 
(1998) 57-73 
70 Vander Elst, para 25. 
71 It should be remembered that Rush Portuguesa as well as Viking, Laval and Rüffert, all 
concerned EU citizens, but at a time when their individual right of free movement were 
suspended by virtue of a transitional period. 
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3. The EC legislature making it easier for foreign service providers 
3.1. The Services Directive 2006/123 – enhancing service provision 
The Services Directive does not concern migration. Having as its legal bases Articles 47(2) 
and 55 EC (now 53 and 62 TFEU)– and not the provisions of Title IV EC – this directive is 
primarily concerned with the intra-EU provision of services. Its main focus, therefore, are 
Community nationals, not TCNs (3.1.1). Moreover, the few provisions of the Bolkestein draft 
which affected posted workers have been dropped from the final text. TCNs, nevertheless, 
may be the indirect beneficiaries of various provisions of the Services Directive, in at least 
three ways (3.1.2.). Indeed, to the extent that this directive will actually facilitate the cross-
border provision of services, it will also increase migration pressures. 
3.1.1. Facilitating the establishment of EC service providers 
One of the main inputs of the Services Directive – and the one least discussed by legal 
writers – is the extent to which it simplifies the establishment of service providers. Chapter III 
of the Directive (Articles 9 to 15) constitutes the first piece of legislation of a horizontal nature 
(i.e. not sector-specific, such as e.g. the TV without frontiers Directive) to align the economic 
with the legal concept of services, setting aside the unhappy ‘duration criterion’ contained in 
Article 57 TFEU (50 EC). In this it follows the Court’s case law described above in section 2.1. 
Hence, it regulates situations which under the traditional establishment/services dichotomy 
fall in the former, to the extent that they concern service activities. This is why the Directive’s 
legal base is to be found not only in Article 55 EC (62 TFEU) on services, but also in Article 
47 EC (53 TFEU) on establishment.72
Such codification does offer some clear added value. First, the codification of the case law 
into the text of a directive – and its transcription into national law – does away with the 
casuistic character of the principles developed by the Court and brings them closer to both 
service providers and to member states’ administrations. Second, these principles shift from 
being ex post remedies for service providers into ex ante obligations for national 
administrations. Third, the Directive goes beyond mere principles and offers practical details 
about their application, something the Court may only rarely do. Fourth, member states’ 
discretionary powers are circumscribed, to the extent that states are subject to reporting 
 
Service providers wishing to establish themselves in another member state, have, in principle, 
to comply with the host State legislation. This requirement has been tempered, by the Court, 
through the imposition of the general principles of non-discrimination, necessity, 
proportionality and mutual recognition. Chapter III of the Directive codifies the relevant case 
law of the Court in two Sections, one concerning authorisation procedures and the other all 
other measures restricting establishment.  
                                                        
72 See above 1.1.3. 
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obligations on the restrictions maintained/imposed both to one another and to the 
Commission (Article 39 of the Directive). 
3.1.2.Enhancing service provision – to the benefit of EC and TC nationals  
3.1.2.1. The provision of information – for prospective service providers 
One of the major innovations introduced by the Directive – and the most daunting task for 
national administrations – is the institution of points of single contact (Article 6) which should 
be able a) deal with all the necessary applications and documents for taking up the relevant 
economic activity, b) assist prospective service providers with their applications and c) 
provide them with all the necessary information. This information should include (Article 
7(1)): 
(a) requirements applicable to providers established in their territory, in particular 
those requirements concerning the procedures and formalities to be completed in 
order to access and to exercise service activities; 
(b) the contact details of the competent authorities enabling the latter to be 
contacted directly, including the details of those authorities responsible for matters 
concerning the exercise of service activities;  
(c) the means of, and conditions for, accessing public registers and databases on 
providers and services; 
(d) the means of redress which are generally available in the event of dispute 
between the competent authorities and the provider or the recipient, or between a 
provider and a recipient or between providers; 
(e) the contact details of the associations or organisations, other than the 
competent authorities, from which providers or recipients may obtain practical 
assistance. 
Such information should be ‘easily accessible at a distance and by electronic means and that 
they are kept up to date’ (Article 7(3)). 
As soon as such information becomes available on the web, it is to be expected that private 
initiative and entrepreneurship will complete it with extra information, on the kind of services 
already available on the market, practical requirements and tips for the provision of services, 
data on demand of various services and other packages of electronic data concerning 
(mainly) professional services. Such information will be primarily aimed at EU service 
providers. It will, however, also be available to TCNs. The information as such will be as 
valuable for the former as for the latter.  
Indeed, one of the main reasons which renders migration pressures fuzzy and unpredictable 
– and thus condemns immigration policies to failure – is the erratic dissemination of 
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information about the market conditions pertaining in the host state.73 Greater availability of 
information is expected to attract more and more suitable migrant workers, both Community 
nationals and TCNs. Next to this quantitative leap, a qualitative one is also to be expected: 
since the information provided online will essentially concern service (i.e. essentially white-
collar) activities, qualified migration is likely to benefit from the whole transparency process. 
Further (third), and in relation to the previous point, the desire of member states to attract 
migrant workers qualified in specific service areas, such as e.g. IT services, may lead to 
further simplification of the requirements for the take up of the relevant activities; such 
simplified requirements may be seen as completing the ‘blue card’ system put in place by 
Directive 2009/50.74
3.1.2.2 Consumer protection – for service recipients 
 In this respect, migration concerns may act as catalysts of reducing red 
tape and rationalising the provision of services.  
Service provision also covers the movement of recipients to meet the providers of their choice 
- and such movement may constitute migration: studying abroad or receiving long term 
medical treatments may take several years. In this respect the Services Directive innovates 
by introducing rules in favour of service recipients. In a short Section consisting of three 
articles the Directive prohibits restrictions imposed by the home State (Article 19), condemns 
discriminatory measures liable to be adopted by the host State (Article 20) and offers 
‘assistance to recipients’ (Article 21). 
To be more precise, the recipient’s home State may neither impose any authorisation or 
declaration requirement nor put limits on the financial aid to which the recipient is entitled, just 
because they have opted for receiving a given service in another member state. Clearly, the 
principles established in Kohll, Smits & Peerbooms and Vanbraekel underpin Article 19 of the 
Directive.75 Similarly, the Court’s judgments in Trojani, Collins and Bidar,76
                                                        
73 See e.g. Triandafyllidou, A. ‘EU Migration and Asylum Policies’ in Cramme, Olaf (ed) 
Rescuing the European Project: EU legitimacy, governance and security, (London: Policy 
Network, 2009) 123-135. 
74 Council Directive 2009/50/EC of 25 May 2009 on the conditions of entry and residence of 
third-country nationals for the purposes of highly qualified employment [2009] OJ L 155/17. 
For this Directive see below 3.3. 
75 Case C-158/96 Kohll [1998] ECR Ι-1931; Case C-157/99 Smits & Peerbooms [2001] ECR I-
5473; Case C-368/98 Vanbraekel [2001] ECR I-5363. For these cases and their progeny see, 
among many, Cabral, Pedro ‘The Internal Market and the right to cross-border medical care’ 
(2004) ELRev 673-685, Davies, Gareth, ‘Welfare as a service’, Legal Issues of European 
Integration (2002) 27-40 and Hatzopoulos, Vassilis ‘Killing national health and insurance 
systems but healing patients? The European market for health care services after the 
judgments of the ECJ in Vanbraekel and Peerbooms’ (2002) CMLRev 683-729, and more 
recently ‘Health law and policy, the impact of the EU’, in De Burca (ed) EU Law and the 
Welfare State: In Search of Solidarity (Oxford, OUP/EUI, 2005), 123-160. See also;. 
 seem to transcend 
76 Case C-456/02 Trojani [2004] ECR I-7573; Case C-138/02 Collins [2004] ECR I-2703; 
Case C-209/03 Bidar [2005] ECR I-2119; See in general on the ‘social sensibility’ of the ECJ, 
Hatzopoulos, Vassilis, ‘A (more) social Europe: A political crossroad or a legal one-way? 
Dialogues between Luxembourg and Lisbon’ (2005) 42 CMLRev. 1599-1635; also, by the 
same author, “Current problems of social Europe” in J. Baquero-Cruz & C. Closa (eds) 
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Article 20 which prevents the host state from introducing any discriminatory measure against 
foreign service recipients. It has to be stressed that – unlike Article 16 of the Directive – the 
two provisions on service recipients do not exclude services of general economic interest. 
Hence, they may be invoked by nationals of one member state in order to secure access to 
services having a social character in other member states.  
These same provisions may also be invoked by TCNs legally established in a member state. 
The Court, already in Svensson & Gustavsson 77 has held that, as long as there is a service 
flowing from one member state to another, it matters little that the recipient of such service is 
a TCN. The Services Directive itself, in Article 4 (3), defines as recipient ‘any natural person 
who is a national of a Member State or who benefits from rights conferred upon him by 
Community acts … who, for professional or non-professional purposes, uses, or wishes to 
use, a service’. More interestingly, it may be that Article 20 of the Services Directive, which 
requires states to ‘ensure that the recipient is not made subject to discriminatory requirements 
based on his nationality or place of residence’ and that providers established in their territory 
do not discriminate on those grounds, is the first EC text explicitly to extend to TCNs the 
principle of non discrimination on grounds of nationality.78
3.1.2.3. Administrative cooperation  
 
The final provision on service recipients aims at making information accessible to recipients 
and at building up confidence for services offered in other member states: electronic means of 
communication, single points of contact, simple guides etc, are all available to the service 
recipients in their home State. This information is different from – and adds up to – the one 
provided under Article 7 (above), as it does not concern the conditions for the provision of 
services, but rather the opportunities for receiving services in other member states.  
Administrative cooperation has clearly lost in importance with the abandonment of the 
Country of Origin Principle (CoOP), since competence sharing and mutual help between 
home and host state authorities are now less important. However, one cannot dismiss 
altogether nine (out of 45) provisions of the Directive. Hence, the creation of one or more 
                                                                                                                                                              
European Integration from Rome to Berlin 1957-2007, History, Law and Politics (Brussels etc: 
PIE Peter Lang, 2009) 147-180.  
77 Case C-484/93 Svensson & Gustavsson [1995] ECR I-3955 annotated by the present 
author in (1996) CMLRev 569-588. 
78 It should be recalled that nationality is a prohibited ground for discriminating between EC 
nationals, but as far as TCNs are concerned, the non-discrimination directives refer to various 
criteria for discrimination which may mirror nationality (ethnic origin, religion, colour) but do 
not explicitly mention nationality as a prohibited ground for discrimination; see Council 
Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000 implementing the principle of equal treatment between 
persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin [2000] OJ L 180/22; Council Directive 
2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in 
employment and occupation [2000] OJ L 303/16; and Council Directive 2004/113/EC of 13 
December 2004 implementing the principle of equal treatment between men and women in 
the access to and supply of goods and services [2004] OJ L 373/37. The same is true for the 
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‘liaison points’ in every member state, responsible for the exchange of information between 
national authorities will certainly help the application of the Directive (Article 28). In addition, a 
‘European network of Member States’ authorities’ will run an alert mechanism whenever it 
‘becomes aware of serious specific acts or circumstances relating to a service activity that 
could cause serious damage to the health or safety of persons or to the environment’ (Article 
32). An electronic system for the exchange of information (Article 34(1)) and some rules on 
the respective competences of the home and host State complete the rules on cooperation.  
All the above are ways to rationalise and adapt the way that national administrations work in 
order for them to cope more efficiently with the increased mobility of service providers and 
recipients. The Court’s extended case law shows that the areas in which administrative 
cooperation is highly deficient are the ones directly connected with individual rights put at 
stake by free movement: pension and healthcare rights,79 as well as recognition of 
professional qualifications.80
These should be seen together with the SOLVIT system, put into place by the Commission as 
a means of extra-judicial settlement of disputes related to the internal market.
  
81  This system 
consists of a network of online dispute resolution available both to undertakings and to 
consumers. The ‘plaintiffs’ contact the SOLVIT point of contact in their country. If the 
complaint is within the ‘tasks’ of the SOLVIT network, this contact point registers it within an 
electronic database and contacts the SOLVIT point in the member state where the problem 
has occurred. The latter SOLVIT point, together with the authorities of the state concerned, 
tries to resolve the problem. This system, after a hesitant start, gains in credibility and the 
number of disputes settled increasing year after year.82 There are, however, two limitations to 
SOLVIT’s potential. For one thing it has limited competence ratione matieriae.83
Direct administrative cooperation together with cooperation through SOLVIT are means 
deemed to facilitate the movement of persons within the internal market. They are liable, 
 Moreover, 
SOLVIT has only vertical but no horizontal action: it may mediate only between an individual 
and a state authority, not between two individuals. 
                                                                                                                                                              
proposed Directive on implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons 
irrespective of religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation, COM 2008 (426) final. 
79 C-326/00 IKA v Ioannidis [2003] ECR I-1703, and for a thorough presentation of this case 
the comment by the present author in CMLRev (2003) 1251-1268; Case C-202/97, 
Fitzwilliam, [2000] ECR I-883. See Moore, “Freedom of movement and migrant workers’ 
social security: an overview of the case law of the Court of Justice, 1997-2001”, CML Rev. 
(2002) 807-839. 
80 For which see below 3.4. 
81 COM 2001 (702) final. 
82 See the annual SOLVIT report at 
http://ec.europa.eu/solvit/site/docs/solvit2008_report_en.pdf  
83 SOLVIT’s mandate covers the following areas: Recognition of Professional qualifications 
and diplomas; Access to education; Residence permits; Voting rights; Social security; 
Employment rights; Driving licences; Motor vehicle registration; Border controls; Market 
access for products; Market access for services; Establishment as self-employed; Public 
procurement; Taxation; Free movement of capital or payments. 
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however, by their very logic, to lead to the rationalisation and simplification of the regulatory 
environment in general, also to the benefit of TCNs.  
3.2. The modification of the Social Security Regulation 1408/71 – extending (home 
state) regime portability 
Regulation 1408/71 on the coordination of social security systems puts into place a system of 
portability of pension and healthcare rights. This Regulation has been modified at least thirty 
times, the last important modification extending its personal scope to cover TCNs legally 
residing within the EU.84 This extension was indirectly prompted by the Court’s earlier 
judgment in Khalil,85
Regulation 1408/71 has been codified and repealed by Regulation (EC) 883/2004
 where it held that the personal scope of the Regulation lawfully extended 
to refugees and stateless people established within the EU.  
86
3.3. The long term migrants Directive – The Blue Card Directive: mobility of TCNs as 
service providers/recipients  
 which will 
enter into force on the first of March 2010. The new Regulation does not radically depart from 
the one currently in force. One of the innovations it does introduce, however, is that it 
prolongs the period during which employees may remain subject to their home state social 
security system, from twelve to twenty-four months. One further innovation is the abolition of 
‘Annex VII situations’, whereby a person may exceptionally be subject to two social security 
schemes. Henceforth, a person, who works as an employee as well as a self-employed 
person in several countries at the same time, will automatically be subject to the social 
security scheme for self-employed persons of the state which is already competent for the 
employed activities (with regard to the totality of his activities). Both modifications strengthen 
the workers’ links with their home countries and should be read together with the Court’s case 
law, discussed above, which recognises a ‘regime portability’ for posted workers.  
The Long Term residence Directive87 foresees a privileged status for those TCNs who have 
legally remained within the EU for over five years. This directive is said to institute some kind 
of ‘civil citizenship’ for integrated TCNs, running parallel to the European citizenship.88
                                                        
84 Council Regulation (EC) 859/2003 [2003] OJ L 124/1. 
85 Joined cases C-95/99 to 98/99 and 180/99 Khalil ao [2001] ECR I-7413. 
86 Regulation (EC) 883/2004 [2004] OJ L 166/1. 
87 Council Directive 2003/109/EC concerning the status of third-country nationals who are 
long-term residents [2003] OJ L 16/44. 
88 On the issue of how to integrate immigrants and the role of the long term immigrants 
directive see, among many, Gross, Thomas, ‘Integration of Immigrants : The Perspective of 
EC Law’ (2005) EJML 145-161; Halleskov, Louise, ‘The Long Term Residents Directive: A 
fulfilment of the Tampere Objective of Near-Equality?’ (2005) EJML 181-201; Handoll, John, 
‘The Status of Third-Country Nationals Residing on a Long-Term Basis’ in De Bruycker, 
Philippe (ed) The emergence of a European immigration policy – L’émergence d’une politique 
européenne d’immigration (Brussels: Bruylant 2003), 269-362; Urth, Ηelen, Builiding a 
Momentum for the Integration of TCNs in the EU’ (2005) EJML 163-180. 
 It gives 
migrants two broad categories of rights. First, the directive gives to long-term migrants a very 
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secure status: life-long right to stay in the member state where they have legally remained for 
five years (Article 8), automatic issuance and renewal of residence permits (Article 8), 
protection against expulsion even where public order is at stake (Articles 9-10 and 12), 
treatment ‘similar’89
More importantly from the point of view of the present study, second, the directive recognises 
TCNs the right to free movement within the entire EC, broadly in the same terms as this right 
is recognised to EC nationals. Therefore, TCNs may a) on the basis of their long term permit 
travel in any other member state for a period not exceeding three months and b) move 
(together with their families) temporarily or permanently in any other member state in an 
employed or self-employed capacity (Article 14). Therefore, they may easily travel abroad as 
service recipients and, more importantly, may move to other member states in order to offer 
services there. 
 to that of nationals of the member state concerned (Article 11) in respect 
of professional life, access to healthcare social benefits, schooling, pensions etc.  
90
A similar right of freely moving to other member states and of getting established there for 
shorter/longer periods is instituted by the Blue Card Directive 2009/50
 
91
Although it is true that Article 56 TFEU (49 EC) and the Services Directive (Article 4(2)) only 
contemplate the provision of services by EC nationals, they do cover TCNs as service 
recipients. Moreover, it is difficult to see how the above categories of professionals (long term 
residents and Blue Card holders) providing services will, in practice, be deprived of the 
 
in favour of the Blue Card holders, after only eighteen months of legal residence in one 
member state (Article 18). Contrary to the Long Term Residents Directive, however, the Blue 
Card Directive specifically provides that this right may only be exercised ‘for the purpose of 
highly qualified employment there’, therefore excluding self-employed activities. Therefore, 
from a legal point of view it may not be said that Blue Card holders have a right to the free 
provision of services, since the main feature distinguishing a service provider from an 
employee is economic independence. In economic terms, however, Blue Card holders will, in 
the absolute majority of cases, be providing services. Moreover, like any other TCN, Blue 
Card holders can travel to other member states for short periods not exceeding three months 
on the basis of their residence card. 
                                                        
89 Though not ‘equal’… Art 11 of the directive draws directly on the equivalent provisions of 
the ‘Citizenship directive’ 2004/38/ΕC of the EP and the Council of 29 April 2004, [2004] OJ L 
158/77, but does introduce various derogations. 
90 It is true that Art 14(5) of the Long Term Residence Directive excludes from its scope ‘the 
residence of long-term residents in the territory of the member states ‘as providers of cross-
border services’; however, to the extent that this ‘exclusion’ seems to be in stark contrast with 
the basic rule of free movement established in Art 14 of the Dir, it should be seen as a vicious 
offspring of the requirement of unanimity in the Council and should be read restrictively, as 
meaning that the Dir does not specifically address any of the issues related to cross-border 
service provision; these are taken care by other texts, most importantly, by the Services 
Directive. 
91 Council Directive 2009/50/EC of 25 May 2009 on the conditions of entry and residence of 
third-country nationals for the purposes of highly qualified employment [2009] OJ L 155/17; 
on this Directive see Zaletel, Petra, ‘Competing for the Highly Skilled Migrants: Implications 
for the EU Common Approach on Temporary Economic Migration’ ELJ (2006) 613-635. 
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benefits of the said rules. Therefore, it may safely be said that the directives on Long Term 
Residence and the Blue Card – two migration legislative instruments by excellence – will have 
a double effect on service provision within the EU: for one thing there will be increased offer 
and demand of services and, presumably, greater service mobility; this, in turn, will trigger the 
application of the rules on the free provision of services in situations they were not 
contemplated for.  
3.4. The new ‘general system’ on professional qualifications 
Mutual recognition of diplomas and professional experience has always been one of the 
objectives of the Treaty. What is now Article 53 TFEU (47 EC) has grounded the issuance of 
numerous ‘transitory’ measures of recognition of professional qualifications already since 
1964,92 then the issuance of the sector specific directives for six health professions, architects 
and lawyers in the ‘70s and 80s and, finally, the General systems in the ‘90s.93
All three innovations are important for EC nationals. They are also extremely important for 
TCNs since their qualifications are likely to have been achieved in non member states and will 
 All these legal 
instruments have now been either repealed or consolidated and extended by Directive 
2005/36.  
Directive 2005/36 innovates in at least three ways. First, it is much more flexible than the pre-
existing General Systems in that it foresees five different levels for the recognition of 
equivalence (Article 11), starting from the mere ‘attestation of competence’ delivered as proof 
of a simple training course, three years experience or general primary and secondary 
education and going up to a ‘diploma’ certifying at least four year post-secondary education. 
Second, in doing so, it allows more extensively for professional experience to be taken into 
account. Third, it also allows for qualifications and professional experience acquired in non-
member states to be taken into account. Article 3(3) expressly states that ‘evidence of formal 
qualifications issued by a third country shall be regarded as evidence of formal qualifications if 
the holder has three years' professional experience in the profession concerned on the 
territory of the member state which recognised that evidence of formal qualifications. Article 
14(5), on the other hand, deals with professional experience and foresees that ‘if the host 
Member State intends to require the applicant to complete an adaptation period or take an 
aptitude test, it must first ascertain whether the knowledge acquired by the applicant in the 
course of his professional experience in a Member State or in a third country, is of a nature to 
cover, in full or in part, the substantial difference’. 
                                                        
92 See Directive 64/222/EEC [1964] OJ L 56/857; Directive 64/427/EEC [1964] OJ L117/1863; 
Directive 68/364/EEC [1966] OJ L 260/6 ; and many other directives, repealed by Directive 
2005/36/EC for the mutual recognition of professional qualifications [2005] OJ L 255/22.  
93 Council Directive 89/48/EEC on a general system for the recognition of higher-education 
diplomas awarded on completion of professional education and training of at least three 
years' duration [1989] OJ L 19/16; Council Directive 92/51/EEC on a second general system 
for the recognition of professional education and training to supplement Directive 89/48/EEC 
[1992] OJ L 209/25, modified several times; both these Dirs have now been repealed and 
replaced by Directive 2005/36/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
recognition of professional qualifications [2005] OJ L 255/22. 
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be more difficult to compare with ‘equivalent’ study levels in the member states. Moreover, the 
fact that experience acquired in third countries may be ‘validated’ ex post, after three years of 
exercising the corresponding profession is extremely valuable for TCNs.  
Formally, the scope of Directive 2005/36 seems to be contemplating EC nationals as being 
the only beneficiaries of the rights it organises. However, the Long Term Resident’s Directive 
foresees that ‘[l]ong-term residents shall enjoy equal treatment with nationals as regards : […] 
c) recognition of professional diplomas, certificates and other qualifications in accordance with 
the relevant national procedures’.94 A similar clause is foreseen in favour of the Blue Card 
holders by the relevant directive.95
4. The impact of the GATS 
 In an oblique, though clear, way the scope of the General 
System for the mutual recognition of professional qualifications is being extended to cover 
TCNs who fall within the scope of these two directives. By the same token, the provisions of 
the General System briefly presented above become all the more important for encouraging 
(qualified) TCNs migration into the EU. 
4.1. Introducing the GATS 
In the GATS the WTO signatory states have, for the first time, agreed on disciplines for the 
free trade of services. The GATS covers all services, subject to exceptions. It covers all kinds 
of service trade across the borders. These are typified under four modes. Cross-border 
provision (mode 1), whereby a service provided in one state is used by a recipient in another 
state, typically making use of ICTs; consumption abroad (mode 2), where the recipient moves 
towards the provider’s state, there to receive the services offered (typically tourism, health, 
education); commercial presence (mode 3), whereby the provider establishes a branch, 
subsidiary etc in another state, in order to provide services; and presence of natural persons 
(mode 4), whereby service providers move to another state themselves or post their 
personnel.  
The GATS concerns measures which affect trade in services in one of the above ways, 
provided they emanate from governments and public authorities at all federal levels, as well 
as by non governmental bodies in the exercise of delegated powers – but it does not cover 
‘private measures’.  
Measures affecting trade in services are essentially non-tariff ones and, typically, are not 
imposed at the border. They follow more and more sophisticated policy objectives than 
regulations affecting trade in goods. Broadly, restrictions in services trade may account for 
one of the following four objectives: a) prevent market abuse, b) make it up for the lack of 
information and information asymmetries, c) rationalise and internalise the cost of 
                                                        
94 Directive 2003/109 above n 87, Art 11(1).  
95 Directive 2009/50, above n 91, Art 14(d). 
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externalities, d) secure public policy (social, distributional etc) objectives.96
Because of its scope being so wide, the breadth of the obligations imposed by the GATS is 
limited and varies from one state to another. Indeed, the GATS imposes two series of 
obligations.
 The scope of the 
GATS is widened by the fact that it concerns measures ‘affecting’ – not only those specifically 
‘regulating’ or ‘governing’ – trade in services. 
97 First, it imposes limited unconditional obligations. These boil down to the duty a) 
not to discriminate between service providers of the various WTO members, by virtue of a 
general most favoured-nation (MFN) clause (Art. II), b) to ensure transparency when adopting 
and implementing the various trade-related measures (Art III) and c) to put into place some 
procedural safeguards at the service of foreign service providers (Arts VI, IX e.a.).98
Second, the GATS signatory states have undertaken conditional obligations, also known as 
‘specific commitments’ in respect of two legal obligations: market access (Art. XVI, covering 
essentially – but not exclusively – quantitative restrictions and measures having an equivalent 
effect) and national treatment (Art. XVII, non discrimination between domestic and foreign 
service providers). Signatory states have filled in ‘schedules’ annexed to the GATS 
agreement, whereby, for each of the two above legal obligations – and for each one of the 
four modes – they commit to a variable degree of liberalisation, on a service by service 
basis.
 These 
‘unconditional’ obligations are themselves subject to exceptions.  
99 For each one of the two disciplines (market access and national treatment) and for 
each mode of supply states have a) specified the restrictions thereto, b) imposed no 
restrictions or c) declared themselves unbound (no liberalisation at all). In areas where states 
have made commitments, some additional disciplines apply as of right, without any 
declaration being necessary (e.g. Art. VI). States may also offer additional commitments (Art. 
XVIII). These schedules are extremely long (more than 30.000 pages for all signatory states) 
and difficult to read and there are virtually not two states having made identical 
commitments.100
4.2. The GATS and migration: present and (tentative) future 
 
Commitments in respect of mode 4 of the GATS are the least numerous and the most 
restricted of all. In the original negotiation of the GATS the intention was that there would be a 
                                                        
96 This is just one classification among many, taken from Adlung, Rudolf & Mattoo, Aaditya, 
‘The GATS’ in Mattoo, Aaditya, Stern, Robert & Zanini, Gianni (eds) A handbook of 
international trade in services, Ofxord (OUP) 2008, 48-83, 68. 
97 In reality there is also a third category, consisting of commitments which apply as of right 
(i.e. they do not need to be specifically ‘scheduled’) but only in the areas where states have 
made commitments, see eg Art VI. 
98 Ibid, 63. 
99 Services are classified in eleven broadly defined categories, plus one residual category, 
which are further broken down into 160 sub-sectors; the main 12 categories are: business 
services, communication services, construction, distribution, education, environmental 
services, financial services, health and social security, tourism and travel, recreational and 
cultural services, transport, other. 
100 Even the EU member states have made a body of common commitments and additional 
individual commitments.  
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rough reciprocity between liberalisation under mode 3 (establishment of service outlets 
through FDI) which was mostly in the interest of developed countries and mode 4 (temporary 
migration abroad) which was expected to be of more interest to developing countries. Such 
reciprocity never occurred despite (or because of) mode 4 negotiations being extended 
several months beyond the official end of the Uruguay round. More than two-thirds of the 
commitments offered concern executives, managers and specialists and about one third of 
these are limited to intra-corporate transfers.  
The extent to which modes 3 and 4 are substitutes or complements one to the other is 
disputed among GATS specialists. 101 A further dispute, and a more relevant one for the 
purposes of the present contribution, is whether mode 4 GATS should be seen as entailing 
migration. According to trade negotiators, people providing services under mode 4 are not 
entering the local labour market because their stay is temporary, they do not form part of 
‘labour’, they are not seeking residency or citizenship status. Immigration officials, on the 
other hand, argue that ‘temporary’ often extends to periods as long as three years and 
therefore, even if service providers do not seek to, they do in fact participate in the local 
labour market by providing a service a local person could probably do. ‘From this point of 
view, service providers have entered the local labor market and are implicated in local labor 
an employment market conditions, including those arising from personal taxation, union 
representation and employer tax burdens in relation to employees. The service provider is 
therefore a “laborer” with all the accompanying economic and social linkages’.102 This vision 
is further strengthened by the way in which statistical data is kept: in the ‘Statistical Yearbook’ 
published by IMF, when service providers move across the borders for less than a year, their 
wages are registered as income for the sending state, while for longer periods service 
providers are considered to form part of the host economy and only their remittances towards 
the home state are taken into account.103
Irrespective of the position adopted in the above dilemma, it is beyond any doubt that the 
GATS does not cover pure immigration control and police measures, typically in the form of 
entry conditions, visa requirements, extraditions etc, as this would seriously mingle with state 
sovereignty and could not possibly be subject to an unconditional MFN clause, such as GATS 
Article II. The GATS does, however, cover most other policies affecting migration. In the 
areas where signatory states have made commitments under mode 4, and unless they have 
  
                                                        
101Mode 4 could be seen as a first step, involving less permanent delocalisation and less FDI, 
towards mode 3, while in practice it is clear that the movement of persons will very often 
occur in the framework of intra-corporate mobility; moreover both modes correspond to the 
same pattern of trans-border service provision, whereby the provider moves in the territory of 
the recipient. In general for the relationships between the two modes see Alan Winters ‘The 
temporary Movement of Workers to Provide Services (GATS Mode 4)’ in Adlung, Rudolf & 
Mattoo, Aaditya, ‘The GATS’ in Mattoo, Aaditya, Stern, Robert & Zanini, Gianni (eds) A 
handbook of international trade in services, Ofxord (OUP) 2008, 480-541, 497; see also 
Allison Young ‘Where Next for Labor Mobility under GATS’ in Sauvé, Pierre & Stern, Robert 
(eds) GATS 2000, New directions in services trade liberalization, Washington DC 
(Harvard/Brookings Institution Press) 2000, 184-210, 189. 
102 Allison Young, in the previous n, 186. 
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made express reservations, they may a) neither restrict market access by imposing 
quantitative restrictions, either in absolute numbers or connected to an economic needs test, 
b) nor deviate from national treatment by imposing special requirements for access to or 
exercise of the service activity concerned. In the few areas where WTO states have made full 
commitments under mode 4 (if any), their obligations are very similar to the ones stemming 
under Article 56 TFEU (49 EC) for EC member states.  
Despite the fact that states have avoided making substantial commitments under mode 4, 
they are, nevertheless bound, by the unconditional obligations of the GATS. This may have 
practical effects, in more than one ways. For one thing, the MFN obligation prohibits any 
discrimination between different foreign service providers; therefore, any facility (if any) 
offered to the nationals of one signatory state should be opened up to all the others. Second, 
according to Article III, states are to inform one another of all existing and forthcoming 
measures affecting the application of the Agreement. This obligation, if properly 
implemented,104 would account for a very high degree of transparency in respect of measures 
affecting service provision, such as opening hours, price levels (if regulated), territorial 
restrictions, conditions for access to the various service activities, national monopolies etc. 
Such transparency would, on its own, and without any further ado, affect migratory flows, both 
quality and quantity wise. Third, regarding professional qualifications and experience, Article 
VII GATS specifically provides the possibility for bilateral, plurilateral or, indeed, multilateral 
agreements of mutual recognition. These, whenever adopted, will also exert pressure on 
migration flows. Last but not least, whenever states have not declared themselves to be 
‘unbound’ by the GATS, and irrespective of the amount of restrictions they have scheduled in 
respect of mode 4, the ‘additional obligations’ become applicable as of right. In this respect, 
Article VI of the GATS, may be of paramount importance: it requires states to a) administer 
measures in a reasonable, objective and impartial way; b) to make sure that service providers 
obtain reasoned decisions in respect of the exercise of their activity subject to some kind of 
judicial control and, most importantly c) to make sure that the technical standards applicable 
to service provision are proportionate and objectively justified.105
All the above obligations, stemming both from the specific commitments and from the 
unconditional obligations, are liable to receive special weight if combined with EC law: 
European migrant workers already enjoy a number of substantial rights and, it is questionable 
whether, such rights should not be extended to TCNs under the MFN clause contained in 
Article II GATS. The main legal reason justifying preferential treatment of EU compared to 
non EU nationals, is Article V GATS allowing derogations for regional agreements of 
economic integration. However, the precise content of Article V is disputed in legal 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
103 Ibid, 193. 
104 Which is far from being the case at present. 
105 This clause may be seen as reflecting the issue of prior notification of technical standards 
organised by Directive 98/34/EC laying down a procedure for the provision of information in 
the field of technical standards and regulations, [1998] OJ L 204/37; this Directive repealed 
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doctrine,106
Regional organisation’s objectives – a test which makes measures subject to a test of 
necessity and proportionality.
 and a restrictive interpretation thereof is favoured by many authors. Indeed, it is 
questionable whether Article V also covers new measures (i.e. measures adopted by the 
regional organisation after the entry into force of the GATS), or whether it has been used as a 
means to allow the integration into the GATS of already existing organisations. More 
importantly, it is argued, that Article V GATS should be interpreted in parallel with the 
equivalent provision of the GATT (Article XXIV) and should only allow derogations in respect 
of measures which are strictly necessary to the fulfilment of the  
107
5. Conclusion 
  
Finally, it should be kept in mind that the re-scheduling of GATS mode 4 is one of the major 
objectives underpinning the current (Doha) round of negotiations under the WTO. Therefore, 
if the effects of GATS mode 4 have gone unperceived up until now, this is very likely to 
change in the near future.  
It is now well documented and widely accepted that democratic states have limited leeway in 
(not) accepting migrants for the purpose of family reunification, or when such immigrants seek 
asylum. In respect of economic migration, on the contrary, there is a widespread belief that 
states are not bound by any legal obligations. The preceding analysis shows that this 
perception is inaccurate and that there are various sources of legal obligations concerning 
economic migrants, whether they are self-employed or in a subordinate employment situation. 
These obligations are more or less compelling, depending on their source, and are more or 
less far reaching, depending on the degree of maturity of the relevant rules.  
Being an early starter, the EU has a clear advance over the WTO, in relation to the free 
movement of workers. This advance explains that in the EU, the shortfalls of free movement – 
in particular in the form of social dumping – have already surfaced. In the framework of the 
WTO, the members of which are far more numerous and way more heterogeneous, a similar 
level of free movement of professionals is not to be expected any time soon, even if the Doha 
                                                                                                                                                              
Directive 83/189; its scope was extended by Directive 98/48/EC [1998] OJ L 217/18 to cover 
information society services. 
106 See e.g. Stephenson, Sherry, ‘Regional Agreements on Services in Multilateral 
Disciplines: Interpreting and Applying GATS Article V’ in Stephenson, Sherry, (ed) Services 
trade in the western hemisphere, Liberalisation, integration and reform (Washington DC: 
Organisation of American States, Bookings Institution Press, 2000), 86-104. 
107 See e.g. Bartels, Lorand, ‘The legality of the EC mutual recognition clause under WTO 
law’ 8 Journal of International Economic Law (2005) 691-720; also available in Shiubhne, 
Niamh Nic (ed), Regulating the Internal Market (Cheltenham/Northampton: Edward Elgar, 
2006), 322-353; also Beviglia Zampetti, Americo, ‘Market access through mutual recognition : 
the promisse and limits of GATS article VII’, in Sauvé, Pierre & Stern, Robert (eds) GATS 
2000, New directions in services trade liberalization (Washington DC: Harvard/Brookings 
Institution Press, 2000), 283-306; it is true that both authors reason by reference to the 
application of mutual recognition, but the reasoning is valid for any type of measure conferring 
preferential treatment to some but not all WTO states.  
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round concludes successfully. If in the field of trade in goods, the GATT was able to get 
around social dumping by the imposition of anti-dumping duties, a comparable technique is 
hardly imaginable in the GATS framework, as it would run counter to the very principle 
underlying free trade, i.e. comparative advantage.  
The rules described above, however, imperfect and problematic as they are, produce a 
secondary effect not directly perceptible at first reading. In the EU, this secondary effect, 
progressively developed by the Court’s case law on free movement, has been termed 
‘European citizenship’ and has been written into the Treaty text itself. This consists of a series 
of procedural rights recognised to all European citizens when moving to another member 
state (and lately also even when they are not moving). Article VI GATS, which becomes 
applicable ‘automatically’ as soon as a signatory state offers some commitments in its 
schedules under mode 4, also provides for a series of procedural rights in favour of service 
providers moving in other states. Could we then talk of the forthcoming emergence of a 
‘global citizenship’ for economic migrants? 
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